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On Pediatric Vaccines and Catholic Social
Teaching
Conor M. Kelly
Abstract
Determining whether, and when, to get one's children vaccinated has become an increasingly controversial
decision, often leaving parents fearful of making the “wrong” choice. Part of the challenge stems from the fact
that what is rationally optimal for an individual is inherently at odds with the best outcome for the community,
meaning that if everyone acted out of self-interest with respect to pediatric vaccines, communal health would
suffer significantly. Given these tensions, the issue of pediatric vaccines benefits greatly from the nuanced
assessment of Catholic social teaching. Specifically, the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace's “four
permanent principles” of human dignity, the common good, subsidiarity, and solidarity highlight the issues
involved and help parents navigate this significant medical choice with a more informed conscience and a
greater sense of their moral responsibilities. The end result is a fruitful alignment between Catholic social
teaching and ethics in ordinary life.
One of the most common laments in many Catholic theological circles revolves around the relative invisibility of
Catholic social teaching among the faithful. Undeniably, part of the problem stems from the fact that Catholic
social teaching is disassociated from everyday life for most Catholics. As Kelly Johnson argues, “The teaching
needs to be more clearly integrated into the ordinary life of faith” if it is ever going to live up to its

potential.1 One of the best ways to do this is to demonstrate the viability of Catholic social teaching's specific
principles for everyday ethical discernment. To that end, this article considers the implications of Catholic social
teaching for pediatric vaccines.2 While this may seem like a trivial matter, the truth is that much is at stake in
this question, for both the moral agents involved and the larger theological tradition. First, as a result of an
increasingly aggressive anti-vaccination movement in the United States, parents are often uncertain about what
is truly the right thing to do for their children. Catholic social teaching has the resources to help parents navigate
this uncertainty, reframing moral obligations in a way that serves the common good and alleviates doubt.
Second, despite the fact that health care confronts people with some of the most self-consciously moral
decisions of their lives (there are ethics committees standing by or on call at virtually every hospital in the
United States, after all), most Catholics find few resources to evaluate these decisions with the fullness of their
faith. What is especially absent is the church's social tradition, for even in Catholic contexts, “a procedural
bioethics that reduce[s] all substantive moral values to autonomy and informed consent” tends to prevail,
largely because theologians have failed to challenge a field “governed by the values of individualism, science,
technology, the market, and profit” in an effective fashion.3 To the extent that Catholic social teaching can say
something substantive about the concrete case of pediatric vaccines, then, it has the chance to break down
some of the barriers still separating Catholic bioethics from Catholic social ethics, yielding a boon for both fields.
The practical result of this mutual engagement is a distinctively Catholic approach to the issue of pediatric
vaccines that moves parents away from a reliance on a narrow view of autonomy and a strictly utilitarian
calculus to a sense of moral responsibility that befits the dignity of the human person created in the image of a
relational God.

I. The Normative Debate about Pediatric Vaccines
In order for Catholic social teaching to have a real impact on the question of vaccines, its theological analysis
must begin with an awareness of the concrete realities that currently define this issue. Broadly, the main
normative question that parents must face when considering pediatric vaccines is whether or not their children
should get each of the vaccines that the American Academy of Pediatrics recommends for all children. If the
answer is yes, then parents also face another normative debate about whether or not those vaccines should be
administered according to the recommended schedule, or if a child should follow a delayed schedule that
further spaces out the doses. While facing these decisions is routine now, this was not always the case. In fact,
barely more than a generation ago, the promise of vaccines so heavily outweighed the gloomy prospects of the
diseases they managed to prevent that most parents regarded vaccination as a foregone conclusion.4 Effectively
aiding parents today therefore requires attending to the unique contours of the current normative debate about
pediatric vaccines, and this, in turn, requires appreciating the larger historical context from which the
contemporary discussion has emerged.
Historically, vaccines have been an ethically fraught issue, and public opinion on the appropriateness of
vaccination has ebbed and flowed over time. The basic principle of vaccination, which involves introducing
infectious agents into otherwise healthy human beings in order to stimulate an immune response that will then
protect against more serious future infections, is fairly counterintuitive, especially on a theoretical level.
Unsurprisingly, many observers balked at the strategy when it was first introduced.5 Today, the theoretical
principle is not as often in dispute, but ethical issues related to the development of vaccines persist. Research
ethics are a particular concern because clinical trials require testing as-yet unproven vaccines in order to
determine their effectiveness. While this is a typical ethical challenge for all clinical trials, vaccine trials press the
ethical questions in more profound ways because vaccine trials start with already healthy individuals and offer
the prospect of only long-term benefits, not immediate results.6 In addition, the actual process of vaccine
production has also been subject to ethical criticism, as a number of vaccines have been built around cell lines of
dubious provenance, from the use of the infamous HeLa cells in the development of Jonas Salk's polio vaccine to

the construction of some vaccines from cell lines derived from aborted fetuses.7 Nonetheless, the primary
source of the current normative debate about pediatric vaccines revolves around a separate issue: individual
autonomy and the burden of the risks associated with vaccination.
In a certain sense, it is not surprising that the issue of autonomy is the locus of the contemporary debate about
pediatric vaccines, because autonomy has become an increasingly central feature of the bioethics landscape in
the United States. Although initially couched as a subsidiary form of the principle of respect for persons,
autonomy has since taken on a more libertarian connotation and assumed a default priority above all other
bioethical principles, at least in the US context.8 Current debates about pediatric vaccines simply reflect the
extension of this autonomy ethic into the sphere of preventative care, where disputes revolve around the issue
of who should decide whether and when children receive a recommended vaccine.
The perceived problem arises because public health authorities in the United States have developed a
recommended schedule for the administration of the first dose of ten vaccines during a child's first eighteen
months.9 This schedule has been designed for greatest efficacy—both from the perspective of the patient's
immune response and from the perspective of public health—so state governments routinely incorporate these
recommendations into their requirements for public (and sometimes private) school admission.10 In an
environment that idolizes autonomy as the gold standard for medical ethics, some challenge these compulsory
laws and the recommended schedule on which they are based as unethical violations of patient autonomy. This
has been especially true in recent years as the number of recommended vaccines has increased and as a series
of questions has emerged about the possibilities of long-term side effects from various vaccines.11 Indeed, the
current normative dispute about pediatric vaccines essentially reflects a desire to reassert parents’ autonomy
for their children's health care, with a growing number of parents insisting that they should be able to decide
what risks their children need to face, precisely because these parents have come to believe that external
authorities are not assessing those risks adequately enough. As a result, the number of children without medical
contraindications who nonetheless enter school without the required vaccines doubled between 1991 and 2004,
and by 2008 the number of parents choosing to refuse or delay one or more vaccines in the recommended
schedule for any reason had reached roughly 40 percent.12 Recent research from one private health insurance
company suggests trends have shifted slightly, but nearly one-quarter of the children insured by the company
were still not fully vaccinated at age three in 2016.13
The current resistance to the recommended vaccination schedules is not simply rooted in the increasing priority
of autonomy in medical ethics, though. Reports of adverse side effects of vaccines have also played a major role
in prompting parents to assert their autonomy in this particular way. The first of these reports appeared in the
United States in the early 1980s, as a TV documentary described an anecdotal link between the combined DTP
vaccine (diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis) and severe seizures, epilepsy, and even long-term brain
damage.14 The documentary sparked national outrage, spurring an increase in refusals of the DTP vaccine and
even other vaccines as well. The association between these conditions and the DTP vaccine was eventually
disproved, but the seeds of doubt and distrust had been sown.15 The stage was therefore set for an even
stronger reaction to a subsequent media blitz about long-term risks from vaccines in the late 1990s that focused
on a link between the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine and autism. Although connections between
vaccines and autism had been suggested before, a 1998 study published in The Lancet proposed a theoretical
explanation for the development of autism based on the MMR vaccine in particular.16 Like the DTP scare, this
link was also refuted by further scientific evidence, but once again doubts persisted, and many of the people
who had heard of the initial 1998 study had never heard that it was later discredited.17 In the United States,
concerns about the MMR vaccine causing autism combined with ongoing worries about some of the chemical
preservatives used in vaccines—especially Thimerosal, an additive containing mercury—to generate a persistent
link between autism and vaccines in the minds of many parents and in certain areas of the public discourse.18

The best scientific evidence to date indicates that the most common anxieties about vaccines are not supported
by the data, but that does not mean that parental concerns are entirely unmerited. While the specific claims
that typically generate parents’ resistance to recommended vaccine schedules are unfounded, more general
qualms about the risks associated with vaccines are not altogether unwarranted. After all, vaccines are a medical
intervention, and, like all medical interventions, they carry some level of inherent risk. First, vaccines introduce
the basic risk of upsetting the status quo because they involve doing something to an already healthy individual.
This is what one might call the intuitive risk of vaccines, and it was the initial concern that plagued the work of
the earliest vaccine pioneers. Today, many of these intuitive risks have been reduced by standardizing the
procedures for administering vaccines and by increasing the stringency of safety requirements used in the
research and development phases of vaccine production.19 Nevertheless, the basic risk of somehow upsetting a
currently healthy individual is never zero.
Second, there are also specific risks, because each vaccine carries its own distinct set of potential side effects.
For example, many pediatric vaccines are associated with relatively mild side effects, like low-grade fevers, pain
at the site of the shot, or other forms of physical discomfort. Some of these milder side effects were very
common in older vaccines, but new formulations have reduced the frequency and duration of these mild side
effects, and most parents manage these effectively. More significantly, pediatric vaccines also have the potential
to induce some serious side effects. Some vaccines can cause seizures, others can cause pneumonia, and some
have been associated with extreme problems like deafness and permanent brain damage. However, these
worst-case scenarios have not been conclusively linked to the vaccines.20 While these conditions are all severe,
the risk of any one child experiencing one or more of these serious side effects is extremely low—the most
common, seizures related to high fevers, are reported in less than one-third of 1 percent of children who receive
the MMR vaccine.21 Additionally, swift action is always taken when vaccines cause serious adverse reactions in
anything more than a few isolated instances. (A good example is the first vaccine against rotavirus, a
gastrointestinal illness, when increased cases of intussusception—a potentially life-threatening blockage of the
intestine—were reported in patients who had received the vaccine. The US government investigated and
determined that the vaccine did increase the risk of this dangerous condition, so the vaccine was immediately
removed from the market.)22 Beyond these specific side effects, there is also the possibility of severe allergic
reactions to a vaccine itself, or to one of its components. The possibility of an allergic reaction is hard to predict,
but as with other documented health risks connected to vaccines, the overall numbers for allergic reactions are
also low, typically fewer than one in one million.23 Still, none of these risks ever disappears entirely, and an
individual's past experience with negative side effects tends to correlate with his or her risk for future
complications, especially in the case of allergic reactions. As a result, the aggregate risk for one child is
exceptionally low from a statistical point of view, but the actual risk for an individual will vary, to the point that
some children may not be able to receive one or more of the recommended vaccines at all because the specific
risks for a given child are unacceptably high.24
Parents, then, have every right and every reason to consider these risks as they make decisions about their
children's health. In keeping with the standard bioethical principle of informed consent, parents need to think
about all of these side effects, even if they represent the least likely, worst-case scenarios because, at the end of
the day, no vaccine is 100 percent risk-free. As two of the staunchest proponents of the standard vaccine
schedule, pediatricians Paul Offit and Louis Bell, state, “If you define safe as completely free of any possible
negative effects, then the answer is no [vaccines are not ‘safe’]. But nothing is completely safe…. The better
question is, ‘Do the benefits of vaccines (avoiding infections) outweigh their risks (side effects)?’”25 Given that
vaccines are administered to already healthy children, the risk of serious side effects and severe allergic
reactions might seem unjustified because the gravity of these problems is so significant even if their quantity is
so low. In some instances, this may be true, especially for children who have medical conditions or previous
experiences with vaccines that serve as medical contraindications for additional immunizations. In most cases,

though, the assessment of risk is a little more complicated because the question is not simply about subjecting a
healthy child to possible side effects; it is really about subjecting a healthy child to possible side effects in order
to keep that child healthy in the future. The real point of comparison for the risk assessment, then, is not the
currently healthy child, but the consequences for that child if he or she actually contracted the disease that a
particular vaccine is designed to prevent. From this perspective, the rewards tend to outweigh the risks quite
significantly.
Consider first the most famous pediatric vaccine, Salk's polio vaccine. While most people in the United States
today are unfamiliar with polio (in large part because of the success of vaccinations), the disease took a serious
toll before Salk introduced his successful vaccine in 1955. Previously, polio epidemics were a yearly occurrence,
known as “polio season.” The worst polio season was in 1952, when the virus left 57,000 people stricken, 21,000
paralyzed, and 3,000 dead.26 The disease therefore carried serious symptoms in serious numbers—
approximately one in every one hundred cases resulted in paralysis—so the risks associated with this disease are
high; meanwhile, the risks of serious side effects from the current vaccine are nonexistent, so there is an easy
case to make for the polio vaccine.27
The same can also be said for rubella, one of the diseases countered by the MMR vaccine, which was linked to
the since-discredited autism controversy in the late 1990s. Before effective vaccines were introduced, rubella
caused serious birth defects, leaving upward of 20,000 babies blind, deaf, or brain-damaged every year.28 Based
on birth statistics for 1960, the year before the polio vaccine became commercially available, the population risk
of birth defects from the disease was 0.47 percent, or approximately 1 in 212 children, before vaccination
became a common public health practice.29 The most comprehensive study examining the rates of autism
diagnoses among children receiving the MMR vaccine found a prevalence of 0.138 percent, or roughly 1 in 724
children.30 Notably, this risk rate was slightly lower than the one found in the control group of unvaccinated
children, further refuting false claims about a causal link between the MMR vaccine and autism.31 Still, if one
were reluctant to accept this evidence, a simple comparison between the risk of serious consequences from the
disease (1 in 212) and the risk of the main condition that generates fears about the vaccine (1 in 724) shows that
the benefits would still outweigh even perceived costs. Comparisons with all the other recommended pediatric
vaccines would similarly reveal much greater benefits from the vaccines than the costs of potential serious side
effects because the current vaccines target highly contagious and often severe diseases, dramatically reducing
the risk in each case, typically without any threat of serious side effects.32
While the benefits of vaccines thus outweigh the risks, this conclusion does not tell the whole story. In fact, this
assessment reflects only an aggregate calculation, especially for vaccines’ benefits, because a central advantage
of vaccines lies in their ability to protect an entire population rather than an individual. Granted, vaccines work
on an individual basis, and they are designed to provide the recipient with immunity from a potentially harmful
disease so that if there ever is an outbreak, the vaccinated individual will not fall ill. Yet this individual protection
represents a vaccine's second line of defense. The real goal of vaccination is to protect an individual by
eliminating the threat of the disease altogether through a process known as herd immunity. The basic idea is
that if a high-enough proportion of the population receives a vaccine and thereby becomes immune to a given
disease, the virus or bacteria that produces that disease will not be able to spread within that population
because the number of potential hosts will be so small. This is effectively what happened in the case of
smallpox—so many people received the vaccine that the “wild” form of smallpox has completely died off, and
children today are not regularly vaccinated against the disease because it is not a natural threat anymore. Herd
immunity is particularly important for those individuals who cannot be vaccinated, either because they are too
young to receive the recommended vaccines or because they have medical reasons (such as susceptibility to an
allergic reaction) that make vaccination too risky. If the community around them has a high rate of vaccination,

then these individuals will be protected despite not being vaccinated because a given disease will not reproduce
and spread within that community.33
The importance of herd immunity adds two curious wrinkles to the cost-benefit analysis of vaccines. First, the
effectiveness of herd immunity affects the perception of risk. Recall that the main data for a vaccine's risk
assessment are the comparison between the risks of side effects and the risks that accompany the disease(s) in
question. This assessment needs to balance both the relative severity of the risks and their relative likelihoods,
meaning that parents need to consider not only the gravity of a serious side effect versus the gravity of the
symptoms of a given disease, but also the probability of each negative outcome. In certain contexts, this might
lead a parent independently to conclude that a less serious side effect was a more dangerous risk than the grave
symptoms of a particular disease, as long as they had determined that the likelihood of actually contracting the
disease was very low, while the statistical probability of the side effects was significantly higher. While there are
scientific data to help in this analysis, most people make this assessment on the basis of perceived risk rather
than actual risk, so personal experience with a disease and the public narrative can greatly impact the way
parents compare the costs and benefits in practice.34 To the extent that a vaccine program is effective and
produces a high level of herd immunity, the risks of contracting a targeted disease are no longer apparent in a
given community. As the dangers of a disease fade from collective memory, the perceived risk of the disease
approaches zero, and awareness of its gravity also diminishes because fewer people have direct experience with
the presentation of the disease. As a result, people in the community easily underestimate both the risk of
contracting the disease and the severity of its symptoms. Meanwhile, as more people receive vaccines, there are
more experiences with side effects in absolute numbers, even if the rate of side effects remains unchanged. This
prompts people in the community to overestimate the risk of experiencing a side effect and, possibly, to
overestimate the gravity of those side effects in relative terms. Ironically, then, effective vaccines can undermine
herd immunity by skewing the perceived risks in a community away from the disease and to the side effects,
even when the actual risks and the true severity of each remain the same.35
Second, although herd immunity cannot change the severity of a disease, it will eventually affect real risk rates
and not just perceived ones. After all, the premise of herd immunity is that a threshold percentage of vaccinated
individuals within a community can entirely prevent a given disease from circulating. The threshold level
protects everyone in a specific population, both the vaccinated and the unvaccinated. At the same time,
however, herd immunity does not discriminate between the reasons individuals are unvaccinated; as long as the
overall vaccination rate of the population around an individual is high enough, he or she will be protected from
the disease. This fact turns a strictly cost-benefit analysis of vaccines into a sort of “prisoner's dilemma,”
wherein the optimal outcome for a self-interested individual can be achieved only if everyone else eschews their
own self-interest.36 More specifically, if a parent expects that virtually everyone else in the community will be
vaccinated, then he or she can reasonably hope that his or her children will be protected from a vaccinepreventable disease by virtue of herd immunity, with or without their own vaccines. Thus, families living in a
highly vaccinated community could avoid both the risks of the disease and the risks of vaccine side effects by
relying on herd immunity. In fact, from an individual parent's perspective in isolation, this is an ideal outcome
because it provides all the benefits without any of the risks.37 In this way, parents who choose not to vaccinate
their children make a perfectly justifiable choice, provided they live in a community with sufficiently strong herd
immunity. The problem—and the prisoner's dilemma—is that this choice is rational only on an individual level. If
everyone were to make this same choice, no one would benefit, and in truth, all would suffer.
In terms of the basic risk calculus that parents are supposed to perform as a matter of due diligence and
informed consent, pediatric vaccines thus pose a peculiar problem in today's environment, where the reigning
emphasis on autonomy in bioethics champions self-interest as the key to rational thinking. According to this
view of rationality, the best choice for a rational actor to make can yield an optimal outcome only if no one else

in the community acts on a similarly self-interested basis. If, however, everyone proceeded as a self-interested
rational actor, then everyone would end up with greater risks. Consequently, the best-case scenario for the
individual is at odds with the best-case scenario for the community as a whole. One can easily see why so many
parents are troubled by this choice. Fortunately, Catholic social teaching is especially adept at navigating
tensions between individual goods and the common good because it begins with an affirmation of the rights of
the individual while simultaneously insisting that the human person can flourish only within a well-maintained
community.38 Furthermore, Catholic social teaching presumes a relational anthropology that challenges the
reduction of rationality to self-interest alone, encouraging a view of pediatric vaccines that rejects the prisoner's
dilemma of an autonomy-based bioethics as a misinterpretation of moral responsibility. In this way, Catholic
social teaching offers the resources to calm the fears of anxious parents while also promoting public health and
thus the common good.

II. Ethical Discernment through the “Permanent Principles” of Catholic Social
Teaching
For all the talk of Catholic social teaching as if it were a monolithic tradition, the truth is that a remarkable
diversity characterizes the church's approach to social concerns. Even when one focuses exclusively on the
encyclical trajectory, shifts in emphases and changes in social context have introduced a significant degree of
heterogeneity.39 This reality is reflected in the varied attempts to generate a list of principles or themes that
would synthesize the most important emphases of Catholic social teaching. There are, it seems, as many lists as
there are list makers.40 Still, there is a certain degree of unity amid this diversity, for many of the lists refer to the
same basic ideas even though they employ different language. Provided the longer lists are used in the
interpretation, then, a reasonable account can be built around the four “permanent principles of the Church's
social doctrine” identified by the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace (PCJP): the dignity of the human person,
the common good, subsidiarity, and solidarity.41
While this collection of principles might seem reductionistic in some ways, the creation of one set of principles is
an especially useful step in the application of Catholic social teaching to an applied issue like pediatric vaccines.
Ordinary Catholics are much more likely to assess their personal choices in light of the church's social ethics if
they can work with a concise, and readily applicable, distillation of the social tradition. A shorter list is therefore
justified as a matter of practical considerations, and then this specific list is further warranted for two reasons.
First, this list comes directly from a dicastery of the Roman Curia and therefore reflects the most authoritative
statement of the Catholic hierarchy for synthesizing the various emphases of Catholic social teaching. Second,
each of these four principles can incorporate other subsidiary themes found in the documents of the church's
social tradition and in the work of contemporary scholars. Thus, when applied to the issue of pediatric vaccines,
these four principles lead moral agents to consider the specifics of Catholic social teaching beyond the surface
level of catchphrases, facilitating a deeper form of ethical analysis that similarly moves beyond a tired reliance
on autonomy to confront a bioethical issue in a robustly theological fashion.

The Dignity of the Human Person
The principle of the dignity of the human person is variously called “the bedrock principle of Catholic social
teaching” and “the foundation of all the other principles,” so it is a fitting point of departure for concrete ethical
discernment inspired by the church's social tradition.42 At its most basic level, the principle of human dignity
affirms the inherent worth of every human person. This may seem tautological, but it is not, for one could
defend a different account of human dignity that expected each human person to earn or prove her or his
worth.43 Catholic social teaching, however, emphasizes the inherent nature of human dignity, building on the

claim that every human person is made in the image and likeness of God and destined for union with God to
assert that dignity is God-given and not human-made.44 The principle of human dignity therefore encompasses
some of the other ideas that appear as distinct themes or principles in longer lists of Catholic social teaching
principles. For example, the sense that all humans are equally bearers of the image of God lends immediate
support to the idea of human equality, for there is no legitimate basis for discrimination when everyone shares
the same foundational character.45 In addition, respect for human life is an essential component of the principle
of human dignity,46 because every human person has an irreducible value that cannot be destroyed.47 Finally,
the principle of human dignity also serves as a valuable foundation for the promotion and protection of human
rights, as the Catholic social tradition has long insisted that “no [one] may with impunity outrage that human
dignity which God himself treats with great reverence,” a position that has turned into an explicit defense of the
rights to freedom of conscience and religion, to work and association, to movement and political participation,
and to a decent standard of living.48 These corollary convictions help to flesh out the significance of the principle
of human dignity in Catholic social teaching, and they can each, in turn, help illuminate pertinent issues at stake
as parents discern how they will handle pediatric vaccinations.
To begin, the principle of human dignity's stress on the inherent and irreducible worth of every human person
gives credence to the idea that parents should evaluate safety concerns as they make a decision about pediatric
vaccines. As John Paul II explained (echoing Immanuel Kant), affirming the principle of human dignity by
“recogniz[ing] in [one]self and in others the value and grandeur of the human person” necessitates an
acknowledgment of each human being as an end in herself or himself and not as a means to some other
end.49 Thus, a conscientious evaluation that weighs the personal effects of vaccines—both good and bad—is
entirely consistent with a respect for each child as an end and not a means. After all, the principle of human
dignity is intimately tied to the protection of life and the promotion of other human rights, including the right to
a healthy quality of life.50 Given the dangerous nature of the diseases from which vaccines offer protection, a
quick dismissal of all vaccines because of the possibility of side effects does not show an adequate recognition of
the innate dignity of each child because such a decision undermines that child's rights to life and appropriate
health care. The principle of human dignity therefore validates the general strategy of factoring risks and
rewards into the ethical discernment of vaccines. At the same time, the corollary aspects of this first,
foundational principle of Catholic social teaching offer two further insights for refining this evaluation so that it
will be conducted in a morally responsible fashion that avoids the pitfalls of a strictly utilitarian analysis.
First, the principle of human dignity demonstrates that the consideration of risks and rewards cannot be
confined to one's own children alone. Precisely because the principle of human dignity is rooted in the creation
of every human person in the image and likeness of God (coupled with the intimate association of divinity and
humanity in the Incarnation), respect for human dignity demands acceptance of the intrinsic equality of all
human persons. In practice, this entails resisting the urge to prioritize absolutely one's own family ahead of all
others. Admittedly, parents do have a right, and indeed an obligation on the basis of the order of love, to show
special concern for their children and their children's rights,51 but they do not have the authority to use this
concern as a shield against the same rights of others. In this sense, the principle of human dignity's insistence on
equality aligns with some of the more challenging statements of the gospels, wherein Jesus questions family ties
in order to challenge the idolization of blood kinship at the expense of others in need (e.g., Matt 10:37-38,
12:46-50).52 Acknowledging this Christian teaching, the principle of human dignity invites parents to explore the
effects of their vaccine decisions on both their own children and others’ children. Given the nature of herd
immunity, this suggests a predisposition to vaccination, but in light of the need to treat children as ends and not
means, it is not an absolute predisposition; individual risk factors must still be taken into account.
Second, because the principle of human dignity is directly tied to the protection of human life, this element of
Catholic social thought also indicates that parents need to be concerned about the research process that

generates pediatric vaccines. Specifically, parents should be alarmed about the use of organs, body parts, and
organic material from victims of abortion because this means of procurement is an affront to the human dignity
of the unborn child.53 As alluded to above, this is a significant ethical concern in the case of pediatric vaccines
because many of the vaccines currently on the market were developed in cell lines derived from aborted human
fetuses. In fact, in the United States, four of the recommended pediatric vaccines (against rubella, hepatitis A,
chicken pox, and polio) are implicated, and there are no alternatives for three of those four.54 The Vatican,
through the Pontifical Academy for Life, has explored the ethical implications of this situation using the
traditional principle of cooperation with evil to insist that the current link to the immoral abortion procedures is
remote enough, and the risks to public health from refusing to use any of these vaccines are great enough to
justify using pediatric vaccines that were developed in cell lines from aborted fetuses when no other alternatives
are available. Significantly, though, the Pontifical Academy for Life also stressed that this decision still entangled
today's parents with the evil of abortion, so the academy insisted that when parents opt for these unethically
produced vaccines out of necessity, they should also pressure vaccine producers to create new vaccines for the
same diseases using ethical means.55
As the application of the principle of human dignity to the issue of vaccine development makes clear, this
bedrock principle of Catholic social teaching entails a balancing act. The principle of human dignity thus sets the
stage for a fuller assessment of the ethical issues involved in pediatric vaccines because it justifies an analytical
approach that highlights the pertinent questions, but it does not, on its own, provide clear answers to the
queries it raises. Fortunately, the other three permanent principles of Catholic social teaching each add
specificity to this balancing act and provide the tools to answer the questions identified by the principle of
human dignity.

The Common Good
After the principle of human dignity, the next principle identified by the PCJP is the principle of the common
good. The church's social tradition identifies the common good as “the sum total of the conditions of social life
enabling groups and individuals to realize their perfection more fully and readily.”56 In this sense, the common
good is about the larger social, political, and even material environment in which people live, encouraging the
perfecting of each of these so that everyone has an equal opportunity to flourish. The principle of the common
good therefore complements the principle of human dignity and extends the latter's emphasis on equality,
ensuring that the promotion of human rights for all is not used as an excuse to curtail the opportunities of
some.57 At times, the principle of the common good has been parsed out to include a corollary principle of
participation, on the basis of the claim that everyone has a right and an obligation to participate in the shared
economic, political, and social life of the community, so that they might both share in the benefits of the
common good and contribute to the specification and realization of their community's collective good.58 Indeed,
this participation is constitutive of each person's dignity and flourishing as well. In addition, the common good
also has a natural affinity with care for the environment, which, for example, could be incorporated into the
“cosmic common good.”59 Fundamentally, though, the principle of the common good underscores that because
the human person is innately social, there is a shared good that is necessary for full human flourishing and which
cannot be achieved in isolation; in fact, it is greater than the goods any individual can create when acting
alone.60 Hence, the principle of the common good is particularly well suited to the question of pediatric vaccines
because the communal benefit of herd immunity is precisely this kind of good.

Given the specifics of the common good in the Catholic tradition, this principle reveals a new way of evaluating
the risks and rewards of vaccines that both presumes and honors the social nature of the human person,
fundamentally reframing the apparent dilemma that results from relying on a strictly self-interested version of

rationality in moral reasoning. As mentioned above, the best-case scenario for any individual in a strictly selfinterested cost-benefit analysis is to refuse a vaccine (thereby avoiding any potential side effects) that everyone
else in the community agrees to receive (thereby providing herd immunity for the vaccinated community and
the unvaccinated individual). This would be a logical choice for an individual, but it has an inevitable problem at
a social level because if everyone were to universalize this “maxim,” as Kant would say, then the system would
fall apart.61 The principle of the common good targets this contradiction because it denies the legitimacy of
championing self-interest in a way that undermines the community's realization of a collective good. Further,
because the common good stresses both the right and the obligation to participate in the creation, realization,
and distribution of collective goods, the principle of the common good also identifies a responsibility incumbent
on “all citizens, however indirect their stake, to make significant sacrifices for such improvements that will bring
broad benefits to society, including future generations.”62 In the case of vaccines, this would imply a willingness
to accept the individual risks associated with vaccines for the sake of the greater collective good of herd
immunity. Obviously, there could be instances where this is not possible for a variety of medical reasons, but
those kinds of circumstances properly transform the moral evaluation, creating legitimate exceptions that honor
one's responsibilities for self-care and rightly ordered family concern. Overall, the principle of the common good
militates against a facile reliance on personal utility in the evaluation of pediatric vaccines because this principle
demonstrates that all persons in the community are interdependent, and therefore each has a responsibility to
do what she or he can to promote the benefit of the community as a whole. For most people in most situations,
accepting the low risks of pediatric vaccines as recommended is precisely the kind of thing they can do to
promote the common good.
The common good promotes the moral legitimacy of pediatric vaccines not just at the level of the general
principle, but also when one considers the common good's corollary commitment to the care of creation.
Typically, discussions linking vaccines with environmental concerns focus on the possibly negative effects of
certain preservative ingredients on the ecosystem, but there is not a significant amount of proven risk at this
level.63 There is, however, another environmental risk with established dangers: antibiotic resistance. Antibiotic
resistance is an environmental problem because entire ecosystems are threatened by the prevalence of
antibiotic-resistant bacteria, which can reproduce with impunity, dramatically upending the balance in the
environment at large.64 Combating this trend requires minimizing the use of antibiotics as much as possible, and
this is where pediatric vaccines can contribute to the care of creation because some of the diseases targeted by
these vaccines are caused by bacteria (e.g., pertussis, diphtheria, tetanus, Hib, and pneumonia). When vaccines
prevent diseases with bacterial causes, the vaccines provide a form of immunity that does not require
antibiotics. If someone who had not been vaccinated were to catch one of these diseases at a later date, they
would likely (or necessarily, depending on the disease) need antibiotic treatments. The vaccine therefore
abrogates the need for these drugs, decreasing the prevalence of antibiotics in the ecosystem. Insofar as the
principle of the common good commends the care of creation, then, it also reveals that parents should be
inclined to have their children vaccinated as a way of embodying not only social but also environmental
concerns.
The principle of the common good therefore offers parents compelling reasons to shift away from the narrow
cost-benefit analysis of pediatric vaccines toward a socially conscious perspective that better embodies the
Catholic understanding of the human person as a fundamentally relational being. This new approach breaks
down the stalemate of an exclusively individualistic assessment and suggests a readiness to accept the
comparatively low risks associated with pediatric vaccines for the sake of substantial communal benefits. This
conclusion reflects a communitarian impulse akin to the one that marks much of the secular public health
discourse, but it also adds a distinctively Catholic flavor to this interpretation by insisting that concern for the
common good must not be reduced to utilitarian prioritization of the good of the group over the good of the
individual. Such a utilitarian analysis would not admit any space for variation, but a Catholic commitment to the

common good emerges from and complements the church's emphasis on human dignity, so it admits the
possibility of exception to the general rule when individual circumstances make vaccinations overly dangerous.
One cannot put a human person at excessive risk merely because the benefits could or would be good for the
community, for to do so would be to deny the irreducible value of each human person that the principle of
human dignity affirms. Precisely to avoid this kind of utilitarian reductionism, the PCJP insists that all of the
permanent principles of the church's social doctrine must be kept together, and this means interpreting the
common good not only in light of human dignity, but also in terms of the next principle of subsidiarity.65

Subsidiarity
The principle of the common good may promote a certain degree of deference to one's communal
responsibility, but the principle of subsidiarity quickly reveals that this is not the full extent of one's relational
obligations. First introduced by Pope Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno as “the principle of ‘subsidiary function,’”
the principle of subsidiarity specifically referred to the decentralization of government power, encouraging “the
supreme authority of the State … to let subordinate groups handle matters and concerns of lesser importance”
so that the state might focus on the large-scale challenges that local communities and organizations could not
handle on their own.66 Subsequent popes have developed the idea to emphasize its alliance with the principle of
human dignity, suggesting that a willingness to leave social and political power at the lowest possible level
“respects personal dignity by recognizing in the person a subject who is always capable of giving something to
others.”67 In other words, the principle of subsidiarity's respect for intermediary institutions between the
individual and the state affords each person the chance to participate more fully in the self-governance of his or
her community, thereby affirming each individual's dignity through the exercise of freedom and also allowing
each person to contribute to the common good more fully. The principle of subsidiarity thus evinces a profound
respect for the human person, encouraging and empowering participation in the common good, but it also
underscores the importance of the family, a social unit that plays a central role in the question of pediatric
vaccines. In fact, the role of the family is so important in Catholic social teaching that some theologians prefer to
identify it as its own principle,68 yet it also fits nicely within the principle of subsidiarity because the church's
social tradition identifies the family as the first and most essential intermediary group that allows inherently
social human beings to flourish.69 The principle of subsidiarity therefore points to the family as an innate social
good, suggesting that parents have the right to make decisions that will promote the well-being of their family.
In relation to pediatric vaccines, the principle of subsidiarity would seem to support the commitment to patient
autonomy that defines contemporary medical ethics. To a degree, this is true, although only insofar as
autonomy is properly understood. Just as the principle of human dignity encourages parents to consider the
risks and rewards of vaccines so that they do not treat their children merely as means to a communal end, so
the principle of subsidiarity indicates that parents have the right to make decisions about their children's care in
a way that is free from undue coercion. The Catholic understanding of true human freedom, however, is not
reducible to the typical notion of autonomy as an exercise of total independence. Instead, Catholic social
teaching indicates that “genuine freedom” lies not in the ability to choose any outcome (i.e., perfect autonomy),
but the ability to achieve the (morally) good outcome.70 As Pope John Paul II explained, human freedom is not
about freedom from moral obligations, but the freedom to fulfill those obligations.71 Consistent with this
interpretation, Catholic social teaching avows that every right comes with accompanying responsibilities, and in
this way, a Catholic approach to bioethics that is attentive to the church's social doctrine represents a stark
contrast to the typical assumptions of bioethics today.72 Thus, while the principle of subsidiarity acknowledges
that families have the right to make decisions about their children's health, it also indicates that those decisions
must be made with an eye toward one's social responsibilities, for “an active commitment to our neighbour … is
not limited to one's own family, nation or State, but extends progressively to all mankind.”73 Consequently, the

principle of subsidiarity creates a certain kind of tension, as obligations to care for one's family are affirmed
while responsibilities to the larger community are simultaneously reinforced.
The chief implication of this tension is a moral imperative to evaluate all of the stakes in decisions about
pediatric vaccines. A quick choice to reject vaccination in order to avoid the accompanying risks is unacceptable,
because this would represent the exercise of a right without any consideration of its accompanying
responsibilities. A conscientious analysis in conversation with a child's primary care provider that identifies a
specific risk for an individual child from a particular vaccine would, however, show a readiness to use one's
rights only in a manner that respects their accompanying responsibilities too. The key distinction between these
two examples is the agent's disposition toward the common good, which the principle of subsidiarity both
presumes and affirms. The first approach employs an individual's rights as a shield from the community's
concerns, projecting an inadequate vision of human freedom that denies social connectivity. Parents in the
second example, meanwhile, begin with an interest in doing what they can to help the community, prescinding
from that responsibility only when evidence reveals that the choice that would best benefit the community is
not something that the parents can do in light of present circumstances. The first example undermines the
principle of subsidiarity, while the second preserves its tensions. Rather unsurprisingly, these implications put
the principle of subsidiarity in line with the principle of human dignity and the principle of the common good,
confirming the rights of individuals and families to assess their direct risks, while also positioning those rights in
relation to the shared public good of communal health. The final permanent principle of Catholic social teaching,
solidarity, serves only to strengthen the connections between these three, adding a further rationale for a
careful, socially conscious analysis of pediatric vaccines.

Solidarity
Solidarity is variously described as a principle of Catholic social teaching and a moral virtue, but it is generally
understood to highlight two distinct responsibilities.74 First, solidarity stresses the inherent interdependence of
all human beings and therefore invites each individual to consider the implications of her or his decisions for
other people. In this sense, John Paul II spoke of solidarity as “a firm and persevering determination to commit
oneself to the common good; that is to say to the good of all and of each individual, because we are all really
responsible for all.”75 Of course, the realization of the common good requires large-scale cooperation, which
necessitates social structures. Second, therefore, the principle of solidarity also indicates that the basic
structures of society should be governed by justice in particular so that these structures can be better oriented
to the full flourishing of each human person.76 Given both of these emphases, it is fitting that the principle of
solidarity is also closely aligned with the preferential option for the poor, because the recognition of human
interconnectedness needs to begin with those who are most marginalized, and the promotion of the common
good requires new opportunities for those with the fewest resources and least social access.77 In fact, some of
the most prominent uses of solidarity in the Catholic tradition have come from the work of liberation
theologians, who employed the idea to stress the need for the church in Latin America to stand alongside the
poor in order to challenge the structures keeping them in poverty.78 As a result of this background, liberation
theology speaks of the deep concern for and accompaniment of the poor as the “primary solidarity.”79 At a
practical level, then, the principle of solidarity asks Catholics to consider the implications of their actions on
others in the community and to pursue social policies that will ensure access to the building blocks of human
flourishing. In both instances, the poor constitute a privileged point of reference for these reflections.
With respect to pediatric vaccines, the principle of solidarity reemphasizes the need to incorporate the common
good into one's ethical discernment, but it then adds a new element by insisting that the common good should
be informed by a special concern for those who are most at risk. Here, the principle of solidarity seriously calls
into question the current practice of refusing vaccines for nonmedical reasons in the United States because such
a decision typically places a substantial burden on the poor and vulnerable. Obviously, the people most at risk

from vaccine refusals are those who remain unvaccinated.80 In the case of vaccines, the most vulnerable
therefore includes children whose parents have decided not to vaccinate them in order to remove the risks of
vaccine side effects, but it also encompasses children who cannot get vaccines, either because they are too
young (only one recommended vaccine can be given before a child is six weeks old), because they have a
medical contraindication, or because their families lack the resources and access to obtain the vaccines. Parents
who choose not to vaccinate their children take this risk on themselves as agents of their children's health care,
but those children who cannot get vaccinated bear the same burden without the benefit of anyone exercising
free will on their behalf. Although the risk is the same for both groups, there is something qualitatively distinct
about the vulnerability of the latter group because these children and their families are left at the mercy of
forces completely beyond their control in a way that families in the former group are not. Furthermore, children
who are not vaccinated for reasons of parental choice are usually from higher-income families, while children
who cannot be vaccinated for other reasons tend to be from poorer backgrounds.81 In most cases, then, the
parents who choose not to vaccinate their children are accepting a risk that they normally have the means to
address at a later date (if that should become necessary), but they also create a risk that disproportionately
burdens the children whose families have fewer resources to handle medical complications.
From the perspective of the principle of solidarity, this outcome is untenable because it allows certain
individuals to exert their social privilege at the expense of the poor, who are supposed to be the beneficiaries of
a preferential option. Given the current distinctions between accepting risks, “the prerogative of the affluent,
and being at risk, the fate of the poor,”82 one could legitimately say, by virtue of the principle of solidarity, that it
is unethical to opt out of pediatric vaccines for nonmedical reasons as long as there are structural impediments
to universal access to preventative medicine. Without that protection, the acceptance of risk by some will
always represent a burden on others who do not have the same luxury of choice.
Importantly, this analysis from the principle of solidarity also extends to the structural level. Precisely because
the poor and medically vulnerable bear the greatest costs when parents refuse pediatric vaccines, a solidaristic
concern for the poor indicates that Catholics ought also to support social policies that will lessen the burden on
these vulnerable groups. Chief among these are compulsory vaccination laws. While this might seem to require
a radical leap in moral thinking, since it represents a public policy concern in the midst of a conversation about
parents’ moral responsibilities toward their own children, a central conviction of Catholic social teaching is that
personal concerns and social concerns are not so easily divisible. Furthermore, since the Compendium of the
Social Doctrine of the Church declares that “solidarity must be seen above all in its value as a moral virtue that
determines the order of institutions,” the principle of solidarity can never remain at the level of personal moral
reflection alone; it must always include a commitment to structural reform for the sake of the common
good.83 The link between Catholic moral reasoning and specific legal proposals may be complicated, but the
principles of Catholic social teaching certainly have a role to play in this process, and in this case the principle of
solidarity generates strong arguments in favor of compulsory vaccination laws.
Currently, all US states and the District of Columbia have laws requiring children to be up-to-date on the
recommended vaccine schedule before they can be enrolled in day care or public (and oftentimes private)
school.84 Every state also has specific policies granting exceptions to this requirement under certain
circumstances. The most stringent policies permit exemptions from vaccine mandates only in cases where
medical contraindications or religious objections have been duly established with the state. In other cases,
exemptions are permitted on the basis of personal philosophical commitments, which could range from an
objection to Western medicine to a rejection of the authority of the state to impose a public health mandate. In
many of these states, philosophical exemptions are easily obtainable, quickly diluting the force of a compulsory
vaccination law.85 For some, these exemptions may seem like reasonable concessions to the legitimate rights of
conscience, or a proper restraint of governmental power in the name of subsidiarity.86 As Pope Benedict XVI

insisted, though, “The principle of subsidiarity must remain closely linked to the principle of solidarity and vice
versa”; so restraints on government power in the name of subsidiarity must also serve the common
good.87 Indeed, one implication of the principle of subsidiarity is that larger institutions of government not only
can but also should exercise authority when lower-level institutions cannot ensure the common good on their
own.88
In the case of pediatric vaccines, compulsory vaccination laws are consistent with the church's social doctrine for
two reasons. First, the public health risks of refusing vaccines is especially grave—a fact the church
acknowledged in justifying the licit use of vaccines derived from aborted fetuses when no other alternatives are
available.89 Second, the absence of laws mandating vaccines would lead to lower rates of vaccination and higher
rates of disease, as studies already reveal that higher exemption rates translate to greater risks for the
population at large.90 Since easier exemption policies lead, unsurprisingly, to greater exemptions and thus lower
vaccine rates, Catholics should, as a matter of solidarity's concern for structural justice, support compulsory
vaccination laws that restrict exemptions to cases of medical necessity and religious observance, with the latter
narrowly defined to create space for individuals—like Christian Scientists—whose religious convictions
consistently oppose all medical interventions, but not for parents who simply object to a particular vaccine for
personal reasons.91 Of course, prudential judgment will need to be exercised in the evaluation of particular
pieces of legislation, but a general commitment to this overarching policy is appropriate.92 By coupling this
support with an attention to the social ramification of their vaccine choices, parents will faithfully embody the
twofold commitment of the principle of solidarity.

III. Conclusion: Practical Implications
The four permanent principles of Catholic social teaching, while not specifically designed as bioethics principles,
nonetheless help to highlight the ethical issues involved in pediatric vaccines. Each of these principles adds new
dimensions to the moral analysis of this case, and together they all point to some practical implications for
parents trying to navigate the pressures surrounding vaccines today. Specifically, the four principles of Catholic
social teaching combine to indicate that parents should adopt a stance of deference to the common good and
thus prioritize the established public health benefits of pediatric vaccines over their speculative risks. In concrete
terms, this shifts the burden of proof. In contrast to the “precautionary principle,” which would require clear
demonstration of zero risk before accepting a vaccine, this stance acknowledges the difficulties of definitively
proving the absence of all risk and instead puts the onus on proving the existence of specific threats.93
To offer a legal analogy, this stance encourages parents to approach pediatric vaccines with a presumption of
innocence. Importantly, this does not eliminate the possibility of guilt. Just as defendants presumed innocent
can be proven guilty on the basis of the evidence, so specific vaccines might be “proven guilty” for the same
reasons. This could occur on one of two levels: either a specific vaccine could be shown to have significant risks
for everyone who was vaccinated—as the original rotavirus vaccine did—or a specific vaccine could be shown to
pose a significant threat to particular populations—as some vaccines are shown to create a dangerous risk of
anaphylaxis in children with egg allergies. If either of these circumstances is established by a reasonable
standard of evidence (and, given the challenges of proving causality and the fact that children's well-being is at
stake, a “preponderance of evidence” standard, rather than the strictest “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard,
seems justifiable for pediatric vaccines), then the vaccines will be considered “guilty,” and parents will have
moral cause to refuse a given vaccine, either outright in the former case or narrowly in the latter if their child is
in a high-risk population. Of course, consistent with their commitment to human dignity, the common good,
subsidiarity, and solidarity, parents in these cases should also look for less risky ways to contribute to the
community's herd immunity than giving up on a vaccine entirely, which could mean requesting another
manufacturer's version of the vaccine if available or advocating for the creation of new vaccines that would

protect against the same disease with fewer risks. By taking this approach, parents will demonstrate a real
concern for their own children's health and well-being without dismissing the health claims of the rest of the
community.
In this manner, Catholic social teaching prompts an approach to pediatric vaccines that moves beyond a simple
analysis of costs and benefits for a single child to a more holistic evaluation of the morality of vaccines in a social
context. This approach yields practical insights for parents, revealing that Catholic social teaching can have an
appreciable effect on the everyday moral thinking of ordinary Catholics. Just as importantly, this application of
the four permanent principles of Catholic social teaching illustrates that there is a realistic alternative to the
reliance on individualistic interpretations of autonomy and informed consent that characterizes the typical
approach to bioethics today. In its place, Catholic social teaching offers a way to see bioethical issues from the
perspective of a theological anthropology that regards the human person as irreducibly social, yielding a
framework for ethical discernment that is much more faithful to the totality of one's moral responsibilities.
Ultimately, this framework can, and should, extend beyond bioethics to all matters of ethical discernment, so
that concerns about human dignity, the common good, subsidiarity, and solidarity will not be restricted to the
theoretical sphere of academic theology, or narrowly applied to a handful of bioethics questions, but will instead
have an impact throughout the concrete reality of ordinary life. This will certainly be difficult to achieve
completely, but there is no reason this important journey cannot begin with a little more critical reflection on
pediatric vaccines and Catholic social teaching.
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